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296 ESTATE OF STEWART [69 C.2d 
[So F. No. 22584. In Bank. Aug. 26, 1968.] 
Estate of WALTER H. STEW ART, Deceased. VIOLA 
STEW ART, as Administratrix, etc., Petitioner and Re-
spondent, v. ADA VAN NOY et al., Claimants and Appel-
lants. 
[1] Wills-Revocation-Change in Circumstances-Marriage of 
Testa.tor.-Pl'ob. Code, § 70, relating to the effect of a post-
testamentary marriage on a will, revokes the will only "as to 
the spouse" and leaves it otherwise intact. Thus, where the 
whole of a testator's estate consisted of realty interests that 
were his separate property, to which his stepchildren were the 
801e surviving beneficiaries, where, also, half of such estate 
was equitably impressed with a trust for their benefit by rea-
son of a mutual will agreement contracted by himself, his first 
wife and' his brother, and where he had been estopped, 
through his use and enjoyment of the subject property as sole 
survivor ufter the deaths of the other parties to the agree-
ment, from making any other disposition thereof, his second 
wife, not mentionecl in the will, was entitled under the statute 
to only n half share of the portion of the estate not subject to 
the agreement, and the stepchildren were entitlecl to three 
quarters of the whole estate. 
APPEAl .. from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno 
County. J.Jeonard I. Meyers, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to determine interests in deeedent's estate. Judg-
ment awarding decedent's widow one-half the estate reversed. 
Doty, Quinlan & Kershaw and William A. Quinlan for 
Claimants and Appellants. 
Gallagher, Baker & Manock and John J. Gallagher for Peti-
tioner and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-This appeal is from a judgment deter-
mining interests in the estate of Walter H. Stewart, deceased . 
• \ppellnnts are the stepchildren of the decedent and the sole 
surviving beneficiaries under his will. Respondent is dece-
df'llt's widow and the administratrix of his estate. 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 2d, Wills, § 226 et seq; Am.Jur., Wills (1st 
~ 526 et seq). 
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The facts are not in dispute. Decedent, his then wife Jennie 
M. Stewart, and his brother John E. Stewart owned real 
property in Selma, California, as tenants in common. On JWle 
19, 1936, they entered into a written contract to will their 
respective one-third interests in the property to the survivors 
for life and to their respective children on the death of the 
last survivor. 
The contract provided that on "this day each executed a 
will by which the survivors or survivor is given a life estate in 
the property held as tenants in common by the parties hereto; 
that each has read the will of the other and understands the 
same and approves such will, and each hereby agrees not to 
revoke or cancel his or her will, without the written consent of 
the other parties hereto. " 
Pursuant to the contract decedent executed a will leaving 
IJis interest to his wife Jennie M. Stewart and his brother 
John E. Stewart for life, remainder to his daughter and to his 
six stepchildren, the children of Jennie Stewart, in equal 
shares. 
Upon John Stewart's death in 1947, decedent and his wife 
Jennie held the property as cotenants for life. Since none of 
the beneficiaries named in John Stewart's will was living at 
the time of his death, decedent inherited John's one-third 
interest in fee simple. 'Vhen Jennie Stewart died in 1949, 
decedent acquired her interest in the property for life. 
After Jennie's death decedent married respondent Viola 
Stewart. Decedent died on May 1, 1965. He was survived by 
his widow Viola, his brother Sankey M. Stewart, and the six 
stepchildren of his marriage with Jeunie Stewart. His estate 
consisted of the one-third interest he owned in the Selma 
property in 1936 and the one-third interest he inherited from 
his brother John. 
Decedent died without making a new will. Viola was ap-
pointed administratrix of his estate, and his will 0.£ June 19, 
1936, was admitted to probate. Viola then filed a petition for a 
decree determining interests in decedent's estate, claiming n. 
one-half share. Decedent's brothcr Sankey and the stepchil-
dren contested her claim. The trial court determined that 
Viola was entitled to half the estate as decedent's post-testa-
mentary spouse under Probate Code section 70 and that the 
stepchildren were entitled to the other half of thc estate under 
the will. 
[1] The stepchildren contend that they are entitled to 
three-fourths of the estate, the half that was the subject of the 
J 
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contract, and half the remaining half as beneficiaries under 
decedent's will, which section 70 does not revoke as to them. 
Probate Code section 70 provides that" If a. person marries 
after making a will, and the spouse survives the maker, the 
will is revoked as to the spouse, unless provision has been 
made for the spouse by marriage contract, or unless the I 
spouse is provided for in the will, or in such way mentioned : . 
therein as to show an intention not to make such provision j 
and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation 
can be received. " 
Decedent made no provision for Viola in his will or by 
marriage contract, nor did he mention her in his will. Thus 
the will is revoked as to her, and whatever interest she would 
have taken had her husband died intestate goes to her as the 
surviving spouse "unaffected by the provisions of the will." 
(Estate of l'iatt (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 348, 350 [183 P.2d 
919].) Since the estate consists entirely of decedent's separate 
property, his heirs are Viola and his brother Sankey (Prob. 
Code, § 223).1 -
Had decedent died intestate, he would have breached his 
contract with his wife Jennie and his brother John. Since a 
"mutual will ... may be revoked by any of the testators in 
like manner as any other will" (Prob. Code, § 23), decedent 
could also have revoked the will he made pursuant to the 
contract. Under either circumstance, however, a court of 
('quity woold enforce tlle contract for the stepchildren's bene-
fit by impressing a trust on the property in the hands of 
decedent's heirs. (See Notlen v. Mensing (1935) 3 Ca1.2d 469, ! 
473 [45 P.2d 198]; Brown v. Superior Court (1949) 34 Ca1.2d . 
559, 564 [212 P.2d 878]; Rundell v. McDonald (1923) 62 
Cal.App. 721,725 [217 P. 1082] ; James v. Pawsey (1958) 162 
Cal.App.2d 740, 747 [328 P.2d 1023] ; Van Houten v. Whita-
ker (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 510, 515 [337 P.2d 900] ; Warwick I 
v. Zimmerman (1928) 126 Kan. 619, 624 [270 P. 612] j under-I 
wood v. Myer (1929) 107 W.Va. 57, 59-60 [146 S.E. 896] ; cf. 
Estate of Rath (1937) 10 Ca1.2d 399, 404 [75 P.2d 509, 115 
A.L.R. 836].) Although the stepchildren were not the immedi- I 
n.te beneficiaries of decedent's promise, it was "made express-; 
ly for [their] benefit." (Civ. Code, § 1559; see Brewer v'l\ 
Simpson (1960) 53 Ca1.2d 567, 588 [2 Cal.Rptr. 609,349 P.2d 
289].) The terms of the agreement were "sufficiently certain 
1" If the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and no issue, the estate \ 
goes one-half to the surviving spouse and one-half to the decedent's par·' 
ants in equal shares, ••• or if both are dead to their issue .••• " 
) 
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to make the precise act which is to be done clearly ascertaina-
ble" (Civ. Code, § 3390, subd. 5; cf. Owens v. McNally 
(1896) 113 Cal. 444, 451 [45 P. 710, 33 L.R.A. 369]), and the 
stepchildren would have no adequate remedy at law by way of 
money damages for the breach (cf. Morrison v. Land (1915) 
169 Cal. 580, 586 [147 P. 259]; Doolittle v. McConnell (1918) 
178 Cal. 697 [174 P. 305].) 
The fact that decedent's post-testamcntary marriage re-
sulted in a partial revocation of the will by operation of law 
does not impair the stepchildren's right to enforcement cf tlle 
contract, for such a partial revocation can no more prejudiee 
their rights than could a total revocation in repudiation of thc 
contract. Decedent had the full use and enjoyment of thc 
entire property after the death of his wife Jennie and his 
brother John. Having thus received the benefits of the con-
tract, "he thereupon became estopped from making any other 
or different disposition of the property .... It follows as well 
that he could not avoid this estoppel ... by a subsequent 
marriage .... " (Sonnicksen v Sonnicksen (1941) 45 Cal. 
App.2d 46, 55 [113 P.2d 495].) Thus, Viola's rights attach 
only to property equitably as well as legally owned by dece-
dent, but not to property that Ile had only legal title to and 
that in equity belongs to the stepchildren. (See N ottcn Y. 
Mensing, supra, 3 Ca1.2d 469,473; Brewer v. Simpson, supra, 
53 Ca1.2d 567, 592; Licit v. Carlin (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 128, 
]38 [7 Cal.Rptr. 555] ; Lcwis v. Lewis (1919) 104 Kan. 269, 
272-273 [178 P. 421]; Ralyea v. Venners (1935) 155 l\'fisc. 
539, 542 [280 N.Y.S. 8].) Accordingly, had decedent died 
intestate, Viola would have received half of Ilalf the estatc 
that was not subject to the contract. (Prob. Code, § 223.) 
That is all she is entitled to by virtue of section 70. 
Viola contends, however, that by leaving his original inter-
est in the property to the stepchildren decedent fully dis-
charged his obligation to them and that they would receive 
under the trial court's award all they were entitled to receiYe 
under the contract. She concludes that the trial court's dis-
tribution of half the estate to the stepchildren and half to her 
satisfied not only their rights under the contract but also her 
right to an intestate share under Probate Code sections 70 and 
223. 
For Viola to receive the entire interest that was not subject 
to the contract, however, would result in a revocation of the 
will beyond that contemplated by section 70 and a substitn-
tion of her in place of Sankey as an intestate heir. Silice that 
I 
i 
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section revokes the will only "as to the spouse" and leaves 
the will otherwise intact (Prob. Code, § 70 [the words" as to 
the spouse" were added in 1931] ; see also Estate of Rendell 
(1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 165, 167 [138 P.2d 378]), Viola is 
entitled to only half of half the estate that decedent willed to 
the stepchildren indcpendently of his obligation under the 
contra.ct. (Prob. Codc, § 223.) The stepchildren are entitled to 
the othcr half of that half as devisees under the will. Had 
decedent died intestate that quarter of his estate would have 
gone, not to Viola, but to his brother Sankey under Probate 
Code section 223. 
Although section 70 reflccts an historic policy that looks 
with" disfavor toward a testator's failure to provide for his 
Rurviving spouse" (Estate of Duke (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 509, 5]2 
[261 P.2d 235]), it gives the Rpouse no absolute right to sllare 
in the t!'stator's separate property; to preclude his SpOUKIl 
from inheriting any part of such property, the tcstator need 
Oil Iy "mention" her in the will "in such way ... as to show 
an intention not to make" any provision for her. (Prob. 
Code, § 70.) It would be anomalous to conclude that this stat-
ute requires that she receive more because the' testator per-
formed his contract than she would have received had he 
breached it. " 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., con-
curred. 
" McCOMB, J.-I dissent. The issue for our determination is 
whether property devised by the will of the last survivor of a ,r 
mutual will made pursuant to a written contract is included 
as part of decedent's estate for the purpose of computing the 
surviving spouse's share pursuullt to section 70 of the Probate 
Code. ,; 
It is appellants' position that decedent's estate is limited 'II 
by the consequences of llis contract and tllat the surviving 1 
sponse's rights operate only on the property not subject to i 
the eon tract. i 
Scction 70 of the Probate Code }'eads: "If a person marries' 
after making a will, and the spouse survives the maker, the! 
",iiI is revokcd as to the l'ipouse, unless provision has been) 
made for the spOllse by marriage contract, or unless thei! 
spousc is pl'ovid('J for ill tli" will, 01' in !'Hlt,h way mentione<l 
thereiu as to show all illtelltioll not to make such provision;i 
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and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation 
can be received." 
The policy underlying section 70 of the Probate Code is the 
social disfavor toward a testator's failure t~ provide for a 
surviving spouse. The law presumes that the subsequent mar-
riage has wrought such a change in his condition in life as 
should haye caused him to destroy or cancel a previous will. 
(Estate of Duke, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515 [1] [261 P.2d 235]; 
Sanders v. Simcick, 65 Cal. 50, 52 [2 P. 741] ; Estate of Lunn, 
197 Cal.App.2d 848, 851 [3] [17 Cal.Rptr. 705, 97 A.L.R.2d 
1020]. ) 
It is undisputed that decedent made no provision for Viola 
in his will or by marriage contract. Under the circumstances 
the will is revoked as to her, and whatever interest she would 
have taken had 11er husband died intestate goes to her as the 
surviving spouse unaffected by the provisions of the will. 
(Estate of Piatt, 81 Cal.App.2d 348, 349-350 [1] [183 P.2d 
919]; Estate of Russell, 43 Cal.App.2d 319, 321 [110 P.2d 
718] ; Estate of Haselbud, 26 Cal.App.2d 375, 379 [79 P.2d 
443].) All of decedent's property was separate property. His 
only heirs were his spouse and a brother, and had he died 
intestate Viola would have succeeded to one-half of his estate 
under section 223 of the Probate Code, which reads: "If the 
decedent leaves a surviving spouse and no issue, the estate 
goes one-half to the surviving spouse and one-half to the dece-
dent's parents in equal shares, or if either is dead to thc 
survivor, or if both are dead to their issue and the issue of 
cither of them, by right of representation." 
Appellants argue that if decedent had died intestate the 
property which was the subject matter of the contract would 
have been excluded from his estate and cannot therefore bc 
considered in computing the surviving widow's share. Ac- !' 
cording to their theory, whenever any of a decedent's proper-
ty was the subject of a contract to make a will, that property 
would be excluded from his estate before any adjudication ! 
had been made as to the enforceability of the contract. Their 
position is untenable. Not every contract to make a particular 
disposition of property will be specifically enforced, particu-
larly where statutory rights of a surviving spouse intervene be-
tween the making of the contract and the death of the promisor. 
The after-acquired rights of a surviving spouse must be consid-
ered in balancing the equities between donee beneficiaries under 
the contract and the statutory rights of the surviving spouse. 
(Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444 [45 P. 710, 33 L.R.A. 369] ; 
::) 
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Saryent v. Corey, 34 Cal.App. 193 [166 P. 1021] ; Ver Standig 
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 344 Mo. 880 [129 S.W.2d 905].) 
Where n person seeking to enforce the contract is a third 
party beneficiary, he would have to prove that the contract 
was made cspecially for his benefit (Civ. Code, § 1559), and if 
his remedy werc at law instead of in equity a claim would 
have to be filed against the estate of the decedent (Prob. Code, 
§ 707). 
'Vhen a person dies, the title to his property, real and per-
sonal, passes to tbe person to whom it is left in bis will or wbo 
takes by intestacy, but all of bis property is subject to the 
possession of the executor or administrator for purposes of 
administration, sale or other disposition. (Prob. Code, § 300; 
Ludwicki v. Guerin, 57 Ca1.2d 127, 131 [17 Cal.Rptr. 823,367 
P.2d 415] ; Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal.App.2d 292, 308. [8b] 
[259 P.2d 925].) Whetber a person dies testate or intestate, 
his personal representative is required to file an inventory and 
appraisement of the estate which has come into his possession 
or knowledge (Prob. Cod<" § 600) and if any portion of an 
estate is the subject of an adverse claim it must nevertheless I 
be inventoried lIlId accoullwd for by the representative in the ( 
course of bis administration. (20 Ca1.Jur.2d, Executors and f 
Administrators, § 422, pp. 617-618, 21 Cal.Jur.2d, op.oit. 
supra, § 703, p. 64.) 
Appellants also contend that it is immaterial tbatdecedent 
left a will, as they have an enforceable right to the property 
under the contract. It is true that the contract and the will 
are separate instruments and that appellants' rights depend 
upon the contract, but the contract was merely a contract for 
tIle right to have the property of tbe promisor pass in a, 
particular manner at bis death. The promisee has an equita-
ble right to demand the property, which right includes the 
equitable right to restrain the promisor or those claimin~ 
under him from impairing the practical realization of t~~ 
benefits of that right. (Sparks, Contracts to Make Wil~ 
(1956) pp. 109-110.) If one party breaches the contract b;y 
failing to make his will or by revoking it, tIle other party ha! 
legal and equitable remedies, not as a beneficiary under thj 
promised will but as promisee or third-party beneficial'] 
under the contract. (See, e.g., Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Ca1.2i 
!i67, 588-589 [12-13) [2 Cal.Uptr. 609, 349 P.2d 289].; Brow~ 
v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559, 563-564 [4-5] [212 P.2' 
878] ; Bank of Califorflia v. Superior Court, 16 Ca1.2d 516 
524 [9] [106 P.2d 879]; OweflS v. McNally, supra, 113 ca) 
I 
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444,454; Riganti v. McElhinney, 248 Cal.App.2d 116,120 [1] 
[56 Cal.Rptr. 195] ; Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal.App.2d 468, 
472 [2] [46 Cal.Rptr. 173]; Thompson v. Beskeen, 223 Cal. 
App.2d 292, 294 [1], 296 [3] [35 Cal.Rptr. 676]; James v. 
Pawsey, 162 Cal.App.2d 740,747-748 [4-8] [328 P.2d 1023] ; 
Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal.App.2d 46, 52-55 [4J [113 
P.2d 495].) 
In the present case, the decedent did not breach. his con-
tract; he made a will as promised and has done nothing to 
impair appellants' right to the property. A contract to make 
a particular disposition of property by will is breached only if 
it has not been complied with at the time of the promisor's 
death. (Ludwicki v. Guerin, supra, 57 Cal.2d 127, 130 [3]; 
Thompson v. Boyd, 217 Cal.App.2d 365, 376 [13] [32 Cal. 
Rptr. 513].) 
Regardless of the separate nature of a contract and a will, a 
contract to make disposition of property by will for all practi-
cal purposes amounts to a testamentary disposition. (Cf. Ru-
bin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 298 [113 N.E.2d 424, 
427].) Therefore, the onc-third interest decedent owned at the 
time the contract was made is an asset of his estate. The 
contract having been fully performed when the testator died 
leaving a will in accordance with its terms, the contractual 
obligation terminated, and his property is transmitted 
through his will. In this heirship proceeding, the probate 
court had jurisdiction to adjudicate all the conflicting claims 
relating tll the assets of decedent's estate (Estate of Bagl1'one, 
65 Ca1.2d 192,196-197 [3-4] [53 Cal.Rptr. 139,417 P.2d 683] ; 
Estate of Plum, 255 Cal.App.2d 357, 360-362 [2] [63 Cal. 
Rptr. 241]) and it correctly determined the respective inter-
ests of the stepehildren collectively to be one-half of the estate 
and the surviving spouse one-half. 
Appellants contend tllat the judgment gives the surviving 
spouse more than she would have reeeived had decedent died 
intestate. This objection is not well taken. If decedent had 
died intestate, appellants, as his stepchildren, would not have 
succeeded to the portion of his property that was not subject 
to the contract, so they have not been harmed. Furthermore, 
one might as well speculate that decedent, without breaching 
his contract, could have executed a codicil devising to his 
surviving widow the property he inherited from his brother 
John that was not subject to the contract. Appellants are in 
no better position to argue what might have happened 11ad 














304 ESTATE 01" STEWART [69 C.2d 
The only relevancy in this proceeding as to whether dece-
dent had died intestate is that the applicable statute of suc-
cession (Prob. Codc, § 223) provides a yardstick to measure 
the share that the surviving spouse takes where no provision 
is made for her ill the will. Her rights as surviving spouse are 
derived from the statute (Prob. Code, § 70) but the quantum 
of her share in decedent '8 estate is the same as upon 
intestacy. 
'fhe facts of this case are that decedent died leaving a will 
in accordance with his contract and did not breach the con-
1 ract. The partial revocation by operation of law operated 
only to revoke the will, not tIle contract, to the extent that the 
surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of decedent's estate. 
By the probate court's decree determining appellants' inter-
est as one-half of the estate they receive the same amount of 
property as decedent promised to leave them. Where, as here, 
decedent's estate was sufficient to satisfy both his equitable 
contractual obligation to his stepchildren and the statutory 
share of his post-testamentary spouse, it is unnecessary to 
consider what the result would be if by reason of the opera-
tion of section 70 the testamenta.ry scheme were defeated. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Burke, J., concurred. 
I 
f 
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